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There are many realities in North Korea […] there is more than one reality at any given moment in time. (Noland 2008) 
Introduction
In contemporary international security discourses, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is often associated with risk and danger, paradoxically emanating from what can be called its "strength" and "weakness": on the one hand, North Korea's military strength, embodied in its missile and nuclear programs and the potential proliferation of related technologies, are considered to be eminent threats to regional and international peace and security; on the other hand, its internal weakness, such as its political, economic, and food crises, are similarly regarded as a menace to peace and stability. The mid-1990s appear to have been a defining moment in the problematization of North Korea. Its refusal to admit inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to its nuclear complex at Yongbyon and its threat to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which almost resulted in a pre-emptive strike by the United States, plus its appeal to the United Nations (UN) for aid assistance to help alleviate the worsening humanitarian situation made the country an issue of international concern.
By focusing on the discourse regarding North Korea's food situation, this paper 1 argues that the question of its food (in)security 2 is not necessarily indicative of its actual nutritional conditions but is rather constituted through meaning-making behavior-signifying practicespredominantly on the part of humanitarian aid institutions working in the country. This is not to say that the paper glosses over the food and nutritional situation in North Korea, or that it disregards the work and motives of humanitarian aid workers and their national counterparts. Famine, hunger, starvation and malnutrition are not fantasies, either in North Korea or in global politics.
Due to his work as a food-aid monitor for the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in autumn 2008, the author could be expected to view nutritional conditions in North Korea as quite striking, as the many alarming reports, assessments or evaluations of humanitarian institutions would indicate. That is to say, it might be tempting to state, simply because of my personal presence at this humanitarian operation, which is categorized by the WFP as an emergency operation, that the situation or facts spoke for themselves. I went there and witnessed North Korea's reality, so I can thus discern what is "really" going on. However, this assumption, namely, that reality presents itself as it is and can be reflected as though in a mirror, is exactly what this article would like to problematize. For if one is to assume that phenomena "speak for themselves," this would not only denote that meaning lies intrinsically within an object, subject or situation, but would also imply that one and the same meaning can be carved out. This view resembles that of the Italian renaissance sculptor Since the World Food Summit in 1996 food security has commonly been defined as a situation where "all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (WFS 1996) . According to the World Food Programme, food security rests on three pillars: 1) food availability, which "is the amount of food that is physically present in a country or area through all forms of domestic production, commercial imports and food aid"; 2) food access, which "is the households' ability to regularly acquire adequate amounts of food through a combination of their own stock and home production, purchases, barter, gifts, borrowing or food aid"; and 3) food utilization, which "refers to: (a) households' use of the food to which they have access, and (b) individuals' ability to absorb nutrients-the conversion efficiency of food by the body" (WFP 2005: 32) .
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Michelangelo, who claimed that his sculpture David was already in the stone and that his only task was to free it.
If such a notion of the possibility of discovering the "real" or "true" meaning of phenomena is accepted, one would agree that it is possible to stand outside the situation in which the phenomenon occurred and observe the unvarnished reality. This notion presumes that someone observing from outside would not be affected by the situation s/he was experienc-
ing. Yet as Foucault (1984: 127) famously noted, "we must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour."
The questions which are of interest here are not whether the supply or distribution of food is "objectively" deficient or whether North Korea is "really" food insecure, as is regularly stated, for instance, by humanitarian agencies. Rather, the question is how North Korea's food (in)security is constituted through the discursive practices of humanitarian institutions.
The paper argues that aid institutions are not external to or separate from the reality they observe, monitor or assess, but are rather constitutive of the categories which produce that reality; in this case, food (in)security in North Korea. The discussion demonstrates that the conducting or issuing of food security assessments, consensus statements, food-aid monitoring, or food for community development projects are examples of aid practices which make North Korea recognizable in terms of vulnerability, emergency, and food insecurity. The paper's central argument is that it is precisely these observations, assessments, and representations that produce and maintain a reality through which North Korea's food (in)security comes into being.
The following section presents the theoretical foundations of the paper's argument. Ques- constitute truth and reality in the first place. In keeping with Said, only representations of reality can be interpreted in order to make sense of it. It is through these signifying or representational practices that the meanings or identities of things, events or subjects are steadily produced-that is, come into being as such (see also Bleiker 2001; Hall 1997; Shapiro 1988; Doty 1996) .
The anti-essentialist assumption does not deny the existence of material facts, events or external reality, but it suggests, in the words of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001: 108) , "the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence." For instance, in April 2009 there was an incident in Northeast Asia which involved a rocket being launched into the sky. This was definitely a real event and took place independently of thought. However, this act was in itself meaningless external to the representations, or discourse, with which this rocket was constructed as a North Korean missile. Similarly, the state of North Korea's food (in)security is not constituted as a phenomenon through mere self-reference but is associated with a created discourse resulting from knowledge, practices, theories, and institutions which define the food situation as food secure or insecure (cf. FAO 2006) .
Since the congruent transmission of a specific phenomenon-be it reality, truth, or the food situation in North Korea-is not possible, only parts of it can be transferred, something which reveals the structural and inevitable gap in the mediating process (see also Bleiker 2001; Laclau 1993) . What follows from this gap is the necessity of filling it through a hegemonic process of representation, in which the void emerges as the very space and condition of all politics (Bleiker 2001: 512) . In other words, the meaning of the phenomenon can only come into being if it is represented by something that stands for it. Representation is constitutive of the phenomenon's meaning and is what enables politics to take place at all. HowShim: How Signifying Practices Constitute Food (In)security 9 ever, since only extracts or selections of a totality can be transmitted, a representation is also necessarily always a reduction of that phenomenon. So, what is important to note is not only the constitutive or enabling role of representational practices but also their intervening and changing character on how phenomena acquire meaning. New meanings and identities are produced through representation. As Laclau puts it, "no pure relation of representation is obtainable because it is of the essence of the process of representation that the representative has to contribute to the identity of what is represented" (Laclau 1993: 280; 1990: 30) . 3
Hegemony
How is hegemony related to this process of representation? When is a representation hegemonic? For Laclau (1996; one can speak of hegemony, if the structural gap which arises from the impossible representation of a totality is filled with a partial account, which from then on embodies that totality. The achievement of hegemony resembles the rhetorical trope of the synecdoche and entails a standard way of making sense of a specific reality, thereby excluding other, alternative, modes of interpretation and representation. Hegemonic representations can be conveyed visually (see Figure 1) (Pinkston/Saunders 2003: 84) . However, knowledge concerning the impossibility of attaining food self-sufficiency is rarely incorporated in discourses regarding North Korea's food situation. Another example is the marginalization of North Korean estimates concerning its own food production by humanitarian institutions. This indicates hierarchal knowledge claims within the hegemonic discourse.
Knowledge
When we connect the theoretical framework developed so far with the example of personal presence, it follows that being in North Korea does not necessarily mean that one can provide a "truer" account of what is "really" going on in the country-for instance, with regard to the general food situation. Again, the food situation is not transmitted in its totality to the on-site observer, but is rather made meaningful, that is, comes into being, precisely through the observer's presence and practices. Crucial in this signifying process is the accumulation and representation of knowledge by relief organizations and their aid practices: crop and food security assessments, nutrition surveys, food-aid monitoring, or food-for-communitydevelopment programs. That is to say, the information and knowledge accumulated by aid agencies serve as the foundation for specific representational patterns in which presumptions, facts, conclusions, and claims to exceptional knowledge are inferred. This signifying process illustrates how knowledge is entangled with the constitution of social subjects and meanings. One effect of knowledge that is understood as natural is the exclusion of alternative experiences and knowledge. Furthermore, through the examination, observation, or classification activities of humanitarian missions, specific situations, objects, and social sub- The co-constitution of knowledge and reality refers to what Michel Foucault (1977; 1980) called the productive aspect of power and relates to inquiries concerning his engagement with madness, delinquency, and (homo)sexuality. 5 According to Foucault, the madman, the delinquent, and the homosexual were inventions of emerging modern sciences, such as psychology and criminology, of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These sciences produced the social subjects through knowledge and disciplinary practices (e.g., Foucault 1977; 1984; 1980: Ch. 5, 6) . A simple example might clarify the relationship between knowledge and reality. In accordance with the legal principle nulla poena sine lege, one cannot be penal-
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The FAO differentiates five categories: (1) general food security, 2) chronic food insecurity, 3) acute food and livelihoods crisis, 4) humanitarian emergency and 5) famine/humanitarian catastrophe (FAO 2006) . This classification serves also as the basis for WFP assessments. ized for a deed without the prior existence of a law that prohibits and, in the event of noncompliance, determines a punishment for that deed. That is to say, the "criminal act," and with it the "delinquent," is constituted through a legal discourse which signifies the action and the social subject as criminal. The "delinquent" did not exist extradiscursively or prior to knowledge (law); rather the deed and the subject came into being precisely through the emergence and application of knowledge practices such as laws, theories, and penal institutions.
3 Constituting North Korea's Food (In)Security
Knowledge and North Korea's Food Situation

The Accumulation of Knowledge and the Performative Character of Aid Practices
Before and during humanitarian operations a number of activities are carried out. Some of them are specific aid practices such as on-site food-aid monitoring, crop and food security assessments, nutrition surveys, the definition of target groups, and food-for-communitydevelopment programs. However, these practices do not merely entail the control and appraisal of proper food distribution or food availability at the household or county level. They are intended, according to the UN, "to reflect the national picture" (CFSAM 2008: 31) . For instance, during travels to and from monitoring sites, which can last up to half a day, 6 aid workers collect a range of information intended to expand the knowledge about the (foodsecurity) situation in the country. The information about North Korea-gathered after twenty-five assessment missions conducted by UN agencies between 1995 and 2008 and which also provides the basis for the UN's country database system-includes the following elements:
• Infrastructure (condition of streets, bridges, railways, buildings)
• Economy (activities of street stalls, factories and eventually markets)
• Security (number of security checkpoints and movements at checkpoints)
• Agriculture (type of crops; seeding, harvesting or lean season; use of irrigation and fertilizers)
• People and their livelihoods as well as health and nutrition issues (collection of and bartering for food; rehabilitation work in the streets, villages or cities; observations regarding diet, income, occupation, poverty, begging, neglected children)
The widely accepted and applied aid practices of humanitarian relief work can be considered to be knowledge-producing practices, which in turn create a social subject-the beneficiary.
6
The institutions to be monitored-kindergartens, nurseries, hospitals, local food production facilities, and public distribution centers-are dispersed throughout the counties, meaning that hours of travel are sometimes required.
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As previously noted, Foucault pointed to knowledge systems such as criminology or psychology that constitute the process through which subjects ("delinquent," "madman"), objects ("prisons," "mental institutions"), or situations ("felony," "madness") appear (e.g., Foucault 1977; . These subject or objects were not pre-given, in the sense that they only had to be discovered; but came into being through knowledge-producing practices.
In this sense, the aid practices of humanitarian agencies determine the identity and meaning of social subjects and food (in)security in the first place. Accordingly, beneficiaries, target groups, and vulnerable populations were not already "there"-that is, prior to the relief engagement of the humanitarian organizations. They became these subjects at the very moment when aid practices such as food security, crop and flood assessments began to proliferate.
For instance, the WFP's practice of defining so-called "target groups" is a performative act which signifies people or groups of people as "flood victims" or "food-for-community- This excerpt points not only to the dependence of beneficiaries on aid workers' assessments and monitoring in order to receive food, but also to the signification of subjects as beneficiaries ("adolescents," "workers") through the practices of food aid and the presence of food-aid monitors. To put it simply, the allotted food is what constitutes the beneficiaries in the first place. It is in this respect that these practices contribute to the constitution of a specific reality rather than simply reflecting it. What can be inferred from the paragraphs above are the productive and transformative effects that humanitarian practices have on the formation of North Korea's (food) reality. 7 7 Aware of these transformative effects, the North Korean government has imposed strict regulations concerning the terms of operation and the movement of humanitarian workers. For instance, since the initiation of humanitarian operations in North Korea in the mid-1990s, interaction between foreign aid workers and the North Korean people has been restricted. This points to North Korea's politicization of the presence of foreign aid workers and international humanitarian institutions. Another important aspect is the politicization of
The Void of Knowledge
It is often claimed that little is known about the DPRK. The country seems to be the veritable antithesis of capitalist globalization. Its ideology, society, and economy are deemed to be outdated, and the collapse of its system is seen as being only a matter of time. North Korea is said to be the most isolated country in the world 8 and therefore a timeless "mystery" (Scalapino 1997), "enigma" (Halliday 1981) , or "terra incognita" (Schwekendiek 2009 ). While this supposed absence of data does not prevent scholars from compiling, dispersing, and depending on information concerning North Korea, it does denote the presupposition of a genuine void of knowledge.
Many scholars argue that humanitarian organizations played a central role in "opening up" (Smith 1999 ) North Korea to the outside world after Pyongyang appealed for assistance in Or as Snyder (2003a: 12) puts it, aid institutions "provide the world with a window on the real North Korea." Regardless of whether relief organizations in North Korea "spread new ways of thinking about the outside world" (Reed 2008: 187) or whether "aid workers contribute to changing the very environment in which they work" (Feffer 2006: 20) , almost all accounts stress the role of humanitarian organizations in closing a presumed gap regarding knowledge about North Korea. An excerpt from Snyder (2003a: 2, 12) demonstrates the extent to which humanitarian agencies are credited with the generation of knowledge about it:
The voluntary admission of international humanitarian aid workers […] marked the beginning of the end of North Korea's hermetic isolation […] The international humanitarian response in North Korea [since the mid-1990s] was the first practical vehicle through which it has become possible to work inside North Korea and therefore provides an opportunity to learn more about the needs of the country and to gauge firsthand its capacity and willingness to move forward with the system changes that are necessary for rehabilitations. The experience and influence of the humanitarian aid community have extended to policy formation in the form of an increasingly expanded database for understanding North Korea's internal structure, organization, and intentions.
Snyder and others (especially Smith 1999 Smith , 2005 suggest that humanitarian institutions contributed to increased knowledge about North Korea by accumulating and systematically disspace in aid operations in North Korea on the part of Pyongyang, through its partial refusal of (random) access to monitoring sites, and on the part of the WFP, through its 'no-access-no-food' policy. 8 Such statements refer mostly on the country's assumed lack of participation in regional or global politics.
However, if measured for instance in terms of official diplomatic relations, North Korea is not even remotely as isolated as Taiwan seminating information, data, and statistics about the country's economic, social, cultural, and political organization. 9 It is important to highlight the connection between the humanitarian agencies' generation of knowledge and the constitution of North Korea's (food) reality.
What the above-cited passage describes is the emergence of international aid institutions as the premier sources of information and their subsequent role in the representation and constitution of North Korean reality. It further points to the supposed existence of a veritable void of knowledge before aid institutions came in to fill it. However, it is crucial to stress that the knowledge (for example, nutrition surveys, crop and food security assessments) accumulated by international aid institutions is not neutral information per se; it is itself already an interpretation. In other words, humanitarian institutions do not "provide the world with a window on the real North Korea" (see quote from Snyder above) but are rather constitutive of the "real North Korea" precisely through their knowledge-generating practices (see also Doty 1996) .
The quantitative and qualitative increase in knowledge about the DPRK due to the practices of humanitarian organizations is not necessarily challenged here, although specific questions regarding the (un)availability of information and knowledge will be raised below (see page 26). However, the assumption of North Korean observers such as scholars, journalists and aid agencies that little is known about the country, which is often combined with the depiction of North Korean society's supposedly closed "nature," sidelines the country's experience and encounters with actors others than the West before the presumed "opening" of the mid1990s. It neglects, for instance, North Korea's engagement with predominantly developing countries in the 1970s, which sheds light on the country's political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural relations with former Eastern bloc states and (members of) international institutions such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and the Group of 77 (G-77). As Krishnan (1981: 313) concludes with respect to North Korea's role in the NAM, "the DPRK's membership of the non-aligned movement has provided it with a tremendous scope and opportunity to interact more effectively with other developing countries in promoting further its trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural relations." 10 One question which could arise, then, 9
The accumulated knowledge about the country also served to inform governments. As the former US defense secretary William Perry stated, "the best source of information that I got was from relief agencies who were over there, not just in Pyongyang, but in the villages all over North Korea" (cited in Snyder 2003a: 12) . The reading of a supposed knowledge gap regarding North Korea on the part of its observers suggests the understanding of a specific historicity, according to which North Korea is represented as a blank space waiting to be filled in by them. It gives rise to the narrative that North Korea was "opened up" (Smith 1999 ) by aid agencies. That is to say, the food (in)security discourse can be said to function as a means by which North Korea's historicity emerges as a result of the humanitarian agencies' ways of knowing.
Exceptional Knowledge
Another effect of the aid agencies' generation of knowledge regarding North Korea is the restriction of who is entitled to speak and act with regard to its food situation. Korea's proposal was the negation of its effective agency by another WFP spokesman. Referring to North Korea's inability to cope with the current situation alone, which would thus necessitate the presence of humanitarian relief organizations, the official claimed: "Our view is that, yes, the humanitarian situation in the North has improved, but not to the extent to which the country can do without humanitarian aid." 13
The marginalization of North Korean statements by UN agencies can be still observed today.
In autumn 2008 the North Korean agricultural ministry reported an expected increase in crop that the presence of foreign forces was a threat to international peace and security and demanded the pullout of all foreign troops (Krishnan 1981: 310) .
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As Christine Ahn (2005) puts it, "the difference between sending food aid versus development assistance is the difference between sending one kilogram of corn versus one kilogram of maize seeds that can yield 180 kilograms of corn.". The question whether to provide aid or development assistance is important because the latter "brings into play a completely different set of organizations and approaches" (Edkins 2000: 73 which the hierarchical subject positions of "donor" and "receiver" are cemented and the effective agency of the receiver is denied (as indicated above by Jan Egeland's quote). Furthermore, the marginalization of North Korean knowledge results in what can be described as "subjugated knowledges", meaning "a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated" (Foucault 1980: 81) .
Representation and North Korea's Food Situation
Imaging North Korea's Food Reality
Visual representations are crucial for international politics because they are among "the principal ways in which news from distant places is brought home" (Campbell 2007: 220) . They entail political consequences because of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker/Kay 2007) . They can have powerful effects, since governments, international organizations, and the public are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian disasters are usually conveyed through media representations (Lisle 2009; Campbell 2007: 220-225; Moeller 1998; Benthall 1993; Postman 1987; Campbell 2003) . As Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) puts it, "we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study (for example, wars, revolutions, invasions, treaties) do not even exist without the media […] to express them" (Lisle 2009: 148) . Campbell (2007), and Pusca (2009) , argue that aesthetic insights should be included in IR inquiries in order to enhance the understanding of the "phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate from them" (Bleiker 2001: 519) .
A (color) photograph suggests the ability to witness reality as it is. As one among several modes of representation, photography has a unique quality since, as Michael Shapiro (1988: 124) asserts, "it is the one most easily assimilated into the discourses of knowledge and truth, for it is thought to be an unmediated simulacrum, a copy of what we consider the 'real'" (see also Barthes (1977) . The photograph possesses a quality of representation which scholars term mimetic (Bleiker 2001) , reflective, (Hall 1997) or documentary (Hamilton 1997) and which implies the possibility that the viewer can see the unvarnished truth with his/her own eyes. However, as Campbell (2007: 221) argues, photographs "are necessarily constructions in which the location of the photographer, the choice of the subject, the framing of the content, the exclusion of context, and limitations on publication and circulation unavoidably create a particular sense of place populated by a particular kind of people." A photograph is neither objective nor neutral, since it is already an interpretation (Butler 2009: 71) . That is to say, photographs produce meaning because they determine what kinds of objects and subjects can be seen and how they are made visible. Photographs are by definition reductions of a given complexity since only parts of it can be pictured. Therefore, they can not only be One picture (see Figure 1) , printed in the Guardian on August 18, 1997, shows a child lying on a floor in a North Korean hospital with the heading "A nation's hunger in a child's face." The caption suggests to the reader "what hunger does," describing how the boy, due to hungerinduced fatigue, "suddenly toppled over and lay motionless on the floor." The angle from which the photo is taken as well as its comments ("lay motionless on the floor") allots the subject (and also the viewer) of the picture a specific position. It conveys a passiveness and a sense of being exposed on the part of the subject (which also suggests a certain degree of inferiority for the subject relative to the viewer). The monochrome composition of the image exemplifies the reduction of North Korea's reality to shades of grey (see also Hamilton 1997). 16 This picture epitomizes a hegemonic representation, with the "motionless" and "listless" child embodying the "nation's hunger,"-that is, the suffering and plight of the people of the DPRK. It provides the reader with an interpretative frame of reference, which allows the reading of the image only in specific ways and also regulates the (in)visibility of objects, sub- jects, and circumstances (Butler 2009 ). 17 Like the synecdoche, the partial content (boy) assumes the role of a legitimate representation of the whole (nation), thereby revealing the hegemonic character of this depiction. The picture-together with its captions-purports to offer a snapshot of the nutritional conditions in the country, indicating that North Korea's reality is proceeding in the same way as the boy's. The part (boy) becomes constitutive of the being's whole (nation's reality) (Chandler 2007: 133) . Synecdochical representations can be crucial in mobilizing and facilitating action, since they suggest a causal connection between the well-being of a child and the well-being of an entire country. By reducing complexity, they increase the incentive to act, "to do something," and imply that actions will be effective.
It is important to note the link between the enabling of effective actions and synecdochical representations. As Charlotte Epstein (2008: 112) notes, "'synechdochism' in ethnology constitutes a set of beliefs or practice in which a part of an object or person is taken as equivalent to the whole, so that anything done to the part is held to impact the whole."
Writing North Korea's Food Reality
In 1995 North Korea appealed to the UN to help alleviate the worsening humanitarian situation. Not only the appeal for humanitarian assistance but also the subsequent arrival of numerous foreign aid workers and international humanitarian institutions were unprecedented. It is widely accepted and acknowledged by humanitarian agencies that the event that triggered the appeal was a famine that killed up to three million people. 18 The number of casualties is highly contested and varies extremely from 200,000 to 3.5 million (Schloms 2004: 115-120).
viewed as a massive famine by the US NGOs, the European Union and European NGOs were more cautious and were skeptical of these alarming claims. For Natsios (2001: 172) these divergent representations reflected "some of the profound interpretive disputes argued within the humanitarian and diplomatic communities" regarding North Korea's food (in)security status. 19 Interestingly, what ultimately happened was what he (ibid. 169) describes as "when aid agency assessments fail": the meaning of the event was debated and defined, thereby revealing the impossibility of the self-signification of the phenomenon and necessitating hegemonic articulations, which read the situation as a "famine in slow motion" (Smith 1999: 471) . 20 In 1996 Sue Lautze of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Lola Nathanail of Save the Children UK conducted assessments regarding the needs and requirements for food assistance to North Korea. The findings from both missions proved to be contradictory and sparked an intense controversy about the country's food situation. As Natsios This interpretational impasse continued until the end of the 1990s and led to the issuance of the so-called Consensus Statement, which were announced by the aid agencies working in the country in 1998 and renewed in subsequent years (UN 1999 (UN , 2000 (UN , 2001 . The consensus 19 Natsios (2000: 173, 174 ) thinks Lautze's report is more accurate but criticizes her conclusion since it "contradicts both the tone and substance of much of the rest of the report." Natsios also reports on an on-site consortium of Christian NGOs and churches from Canada, which supports Nathanail in some aspects (ibid. 174; see also Smith 2005: 127) . 20 Likewise, Hazel Smith (2009: 253) points to a debate around the question of whether the situation should be regarded as a failure of food availability, which denotes the lack of food, or accessibility, which refers to the lack of access to available food. To address the concerns of humanitarian organizations regarding appropriate operating conditions, a set of "humanitarian principles" were worked out between 1998 and 2001. However, four NGOs left North Korea between 1998 and 2000 citing restrictions on operating conditions (Smith 2002: 7; 2005: 127) . Korea also stated that millions were facing "severe deprivation" not seen in a decade. 24 These opinions were shared by some of the well-known scholars studying the DPRK. Although
Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland explicitly criticized UN data and figures, they con- In addition, in December 2008 North Korea reported that it expected a significant increase in its potato harvest ("N. Korea expected to harvest 3 million tons of potatoes: official," Yonhap News Agency, 21.12.08).
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"UN Officials Seek More Aid for North Korea," The Korea Times, 24.10.08.
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In their report the consultants acknowledged that the food situation (first half of 2008) was "subject to widely diverging estimates, ranging from a worrying food gap (FAO, WFP) to a much less critical deficit ( Regardless of which of the recent accounts is the most accurate, they collectively demonstrate "that within each realm of policy discourse it is possible to construct, in its own terms, a competing narrative that denaturalizes and unsettles the dominant ways of constructing the world" (Campbell 1998: 172) . The alternative framing of North Korea's food situation by South Korean and European agencies renders ambiguous the predominant tenet, which warns of a humanitarian emergency, and reveals the material consequences and political character of making sense of reality. 28 However, the emergency operation by the UN in 2008, the responses and appeals from governments and NGOs warning of a severe humanitarian crisis, and the alarming reports from newspapers and academic studies point to a discursive framework which has increasingly equated North Korea's food situation with insufficiency, vulnerability, and calamity.
The UN's Role
A special role in framing North Korea's food (in)security can be attributed to UN agencies since other actors such as the press, scientists, policymakers and other humanitarian organizations view the UN as credible and, therefore, refer to or disseminate UN data. UN agencies have been in a comparatively favorable position relative to other international relief organizations with regard to establishing contacts with the DPRK government as they were the first to enter the country in the 1980s. 29 Because of their established relationship with the government, UN agencies (along with two NGOs) were also the first to respond to North Korean appeals for humanitarian assistance in the mid-1990s (Smith 2005: 113) . Through the WFP's early and constant humanitarian engagement as well as its comprehensive logistics capabilities, the organization gained an exceptional operating position in the DPRK, which, according to its own statements, allows it to "scale-up any necessary surge in operations" (CFSAM 2008: 33) . The intention here is not to deny the WFP's humanitarian contributions, but rather to stress its importance in North Korean humanitarian politics; the UN agency "has now become an essential crutch upon which North Korea depends for its survival" (Snyder 2003a: 8) . The WFP has been not only the main provider and distributor of humanitarian aid but also the chief negotiator in discussions with the North Korean government on behalf of the humanitarian agencies operating in the country (Smith 2005: 101) . The WFP is also the key actor in terms of manpower and financial resources.
The post of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, which is located within the WFP, is one expression of the UN agencies' exceptional position. It not only enables the appointee to spur and facilitate consensus building among the humanitarian institutions but also grants 28
That is to say that while the UN were to start one of the largest humanitarian operations in its history, the South Korean government for the first time denied humanitarian assistance to North Korea. In addition, as of 1998 the UN coordinated the annual humanitarian appeal mechanism of all relief institutions operating in North Korea, thereby increasing its weight in the country's humanitarian politics. The so-called Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal was an integrated approach which functioned as a worldwide instrument to synchronize responses to humanitarian crises. It provided a more integrated channel to raise awareness of the food situation in the DPRK and communicate this to the outside world than the fragmented responses and appeals that had previously been made by the individual humanitarian institutions (Smith 2005: 102-114 ).
Excursus: The Practical Difficulties of Assessing the Food Situation in North Korea
The assessment, evaluation and monitoring of situations bring with them several difficulties, including questions regarding the reliability, coherence and methodology of these practices.
A UN report from 2008 summarizing North Korea's crop and food security provides insights into the "key limitations," of such assessments (CFSAM 2008: 23) . These were noted as follows:
firstly, the length of fieldwork was short and therefore time spent in each province was limited and resulted in only 3-5 household interviews. Secondly the households interviewed were selected by government authorities and were not randomly picked.
Thirdly, there was a sense that interpretation of questions and responses may have been misunderstood or incomplete reflecting cultural sensitivities. 32 With reference to the translation and language barriers that might arise during assessment or monitoring missions, Edkins (2000: 96) observes that "the potential for misunderstandings 30 Morton was also WFP representative, UNDP country director, and UN resident representative.
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The above-mentioned consensus statements were issued under the chairmanship of the Humanitarian Coordinator. A further issue is the availability of information, and statistics on North Korea. This is not to say that this paper aims to question the reliability of the available data or to provide the reader with newly investigated "hard facts." Rather, it aims to direct attention to an ambivalent situation in which many scholars (and also journalist, policymakers, and international institutions) claim to have only unreliable or scarce information about North Korea, something which would make the research situation unique or difficult. However, this "lack" of information does not appear to keep them from publishing data, drawing conclusions, and recommending actions as many reports, statements, and figures are constantly being released.
A good example of this ambivalence is provided by Kim et al., who published an assessment of the food situation in the DPRK at the end of the 1990s (1998; but see also Chae/Zang 2002; Eberstadt 2007 Eberstadt , 1999 Kwon 2009; Noland 1997; Scalapino 1997; Schloms 2003; Schwekendiek 2008) . Although the authors claim that "little is known about North Korea's food production and consumption," they nonetheless "assess North Korea's grain consumption and production" by using "indirect indicators, circumstantial evidence, and inferences" (Kim et al. 1998: 520) . A more recent example is provided by Kwon (2009 North Korean households. These informal activities include the consumption, trading, bartering, or sale of self-cultivated food and manufactured goods at markets. Other studies (e.g., Kim/Song 2008: 366-367) suggest that the share of informal earnings as a percentage of North Korean households' total income is as high as 90-98 percent. These findings point to the significance of local markets as the main source of food (and, partially, income) , as opposed to the Public Distribution System (PDS), which is run by North Korean authorities and used by the WFP for the rationing of food. 35 The results imply that the importance of markets for North Korean people also has to be considered in assessments of the country's overall food situation.
In other words, if markets in North Korea are, according to UN agencies, "important sources of additional income" and food (EMOP 2008: paragraph 3, 9) but cannot be considered in a "detailed analysis of market contribution to household food security" (CFSAM 2008: 25) , pivotal mechanisms for the delivery and exchange of goods and services are being left out of the food security analysis. Questions regarding the completeness of such a study can thus be raised, as one of the central pillars of food security-food accessibility (WFP 2005: 31-32)-is not being (or cannot be) considered in evaluations of the food situation. 36 Other scholars (e.g., Dalton et al. 2009; Lankov/Kim 2008) argue that gender aspects should also be considered in order to adequately evaluate food security and the economic situation in North Korea since women play a central role in securing, producing, and trading food for their families in the informal sector.
Conclusion
The main aim of the paper has been to highlight the role and importance of representational practices on the part of humanitarian actors in the constitution of North Korea's food reality.
It has been argued that the generation of knowledge by aid organizations is related to with the formation of particular situations and social subjects. Consequently, the meaning of a phenomenon such as the food situation in North Korea (for instance "secure" or "insecure")
is not naturally inscribed in the phenomenon itself, but is rather associated with a discourse of knowledge, practices, theories and representations.
The argument regarding the "discursiveness" of meaning and reality is not meant to suggest that aid workers deliberately fabricate famine, hunger, or starvation. The author's intention has not been to question humanitarian aid efforts in general or in particular. Rather, it has 35 Snyder (2003b: 119) explicitly criticizes the WFP for its reliance on the PDS, stating, "The amount of food distributed through the PDS is no longer an accurate indicator of imminent distress within the North Korean system, yet it has remained the WFP's primary indicator of distress and the primary vehicle through which the WFP distributes food inside the country."
36
It should be noted that information on markets and price levels in North Korea is said to be sensitive and therefore difficult to obtain.
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Shim: How Signifying Practices Constitute Food (In)security been to show how the discourse of food (in)security has become one of the main practices through which North Korea's reality is signified. It has become almost natural to privilege knowledge that takes for granted alarming reports about North Korea's food situation. The country appears to be in a constant state of humanitarian crisis; this leads to the prioritization of food shipments and UN assessments over development assistance and alternative projections.
Recalling briefly Foucault's (1977) examination of the prison system, according to which delinquents were produced through the emergence of the prison and its concomitants, such as criminology and law, we may similarly conclude that, like prisons-which do not prevent but rather produce crime-the practices of food aid do not avert food insecurity but rather bring it into being.
Some of the original insights and perspectives provided in this paper provoke questions concerning the general realm of international humanitarian affairs. From a broader perspective, food insecurity or hunger appears to be a problem limited exclusively to so-called underde- (in)security are applied to the latter regions, it turns out that millions of people in these "developed" countries are similarly without "economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (WFS 1996) . For instance, a report carried out under the auspices of the US Department of Agriculture using the same food security definition identified 36.23 million people or approximately 11 percent of households in the United States as food insecure (Nord et al. 2008) . Over 12 million of these people were children (ibid. 7). If the "active and healthy" elements of the food security definition are also applied to the more wealthy countries, their food security can also be questioned-for instance, if one thinks of the trend of increasing child and adult obesity. That the issue of food insecurity in these regions is not problematized in terms of international food assistance, vulnerability, and the inability of governments to adequately feed their own people points to the political character of the issue and illuminates the power relations in play in global politics.
